Asymmetric Warfare: An Overview

Asymmetric warfare is a very old method, but has garnered great attention since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Asymmetric warfare is as old as war itself. Broadly defined, it is the ability to use your strengths against an opponents weaknesses in order to gain an advantage.¹However, asymmetric warfare is often contemplated and considered on the strategic level of war, making a clear definition much more ambiguous. The current published working definition of asymmetric warfare used by the United States is:

"Asymmetric approaches are attempts to circumvent or undermine US strengths while exploiting US weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the United Statesí expected method of operations. [Asymmetric approaches] generally seek a major psychological impact, such as shock or confusion that affects an opponentís initiative, freedom of action, or will. Asymmetric methods require an appreciation of an opponentís vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches often employ innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons, or technologies, and can be applied at all levels of warfare -- strategic, operational, and tactical -- and across the spectrum of military operations."²

Two other definitions have been recently offered that more narrowly, relevantly target the discussion. One of them has been offered by Steven Metz of the U.S. Army War College, regarded by most to be the foremost strategist regarding asymmetric warfare, and the other by Kenneth McKenzie, another highly regarded strategist in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Metzí definition is as follows:

"In the realm of military affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize oneís own advantages, exploit an opponentís weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operational, or a combination of these. It can entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, time perspectives, or some combination of these. It can be short-term or long-term. It can be deliberate or by default. It can be discrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetric approaches. It can have both psychological and physical dimensions."³

Metzí definition is quite thorough and specific in calling out the areas that should be focused on when considering asymmetric threats, responses to asymmetric threats, or the creation of asymmetric advantages. McKenzieís definition is not quite as elaborate, but make the same general point:

"Leveraging inferior tactical or operational strength against American vulnerabilities to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining American will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor's strategic objectives."⁴

McKenzieís definition is Ameracentric in view and scope, but can also be applied to any other country evaluating the American threat to their interests and homeland. These three definitions provide an excellent point from which to begin to understand the nature of asymmetric warfare from the perspective of asymmetric characteristics, forms of asymmetry, and possible weapons to be employed in an asymmetric attack. It should also be pointed out there are major differences between state and non-state asymmetry. Prior to September 11, the United States had very little contact with non-state actors that threatened strategic national interests or homeland. The entire focus of change in the United States since September 11 has been to prepare for asymmetric attacks at home and abroad by non-state actors. Before diving into the characteristics, forms, and weapons of asymmetric warfare, let us take a look at some historical examples of asymmetric warfare during the worldís major wars.

The history of asymmetry in warfare can be traced back to the origins of war. Sun Tzu in The Art of War says, "All war is based on deception."⁵ Furthermore, Sun Tzu based an entire section of The Art of War on strengths and weaknesses, which today we call the threat-response dynamic. Since the time of Sun Tzu, we have seen asymmetric approaches used in every conflict. Most notably from an American perspective are the Germanís use of Lenin and the sealed train in World War I, the German blitzkrieg of World War II, the American use of the hydrogen bomb in World War II against Japan, the Japanese use of the torpedo in the Russo-Japanese War and World War II, the Viet Cong strategy against the United States during the American involvement in the Vietnam War, and the Iraqi use of their own people as human shields during the Gulf War. Each of these examples illustrates different asymmetric methods. Toward the end World War I, the Germans were facing massive pressure from the Russians. However, the Germans also knew that there was a great deal of internal conflict in Russia. In order to escalate the internal conflict in Russia, the Germans located Lenin, who was in exile in Switzerland, and put him on a secret, sealed train to Moscow. Leninís arrival had obtained the desired effect of pulling some of the troops on the Eastern front back to Moscow and St. Petersburg to protect the cities during 1917 and 1918. This is a classic example of asymmetric information tactics. Little did the Germans know that this victory, while being strategic in World War I, would create a fierce opponent in World War II that they would not be able to overcome.⁶ The German blitzkrieg of World War II was a perfect example of using a technological asymmetry superiorly employed, as is the Japanese use of the torpedo in the Russo-Japanese War and World War II.⁷ The Viet Cong strategy took on many facets of asymmetry in order to overcome a wholly superior opponent. The Viet Cong strategy was three fold. First, they created a close knit political party and recruited fanatical members. Second, they conducted aggressive campaigns against the local governments, hid guerilla among the local villagers, and orchestrated attacks at the local lever. The third and final phase brought all of their forces together to conduct a massive, full-scale offensive against the government once victory was in sight.⁸ The Viet Cong strategy was also propelled into the media by American journalists, something that has become known as the "CNN effect."⁹ The combination of the guerrilla tactics and manipulation of the mass media in order to influence the political interests of the United States homeland are what are generally attributed to the loss of the Vietnam War. History is full of examples of asymmetry in state warfare. What has not been seen on a wide scale for centuries is non-state actors attacking a state or coalition of states. It is this focus on non-state actors that has revived and hyper accelerated the recent discussions about asymmetry, primarily because of the Gulf War, the conflicts in the Middle East, and the continued guerrilla wars in South America. The possibility of an asymmetric attack, particularly on the United States homeland, was thrown in our faces on September 11, 2001, when theory became a reality.

So what leads to the creation of an asymmetry? There are many characteristics underlying an asymmetry. First of all, there must be a disparity in interest between the two opposing forces. This disparity of interest may be real or perceived. Below is a matrix that summarizes a potential opponentís effective choices when considering the employment of asymmetric approaches against the United States.¹⁰ This matrix can be generalized for use in a conflict between almost any country.

While disparity of interest, real or perceived, is often the catalyst for asymmetric attacks, it is often the will of the opponent that is the target of the attack rather than the physical target.Asymmetric attacks are often characterized as tactical operations that are meant to achieve some strategic objective or outcome. Often this strategic outcome is to dampen the will of the opponent to engage in battle, prevent the opponent from engaging in battle, or destroy the will of the opponent to stay engaged in battle for a protracted period. These are the most pronounced strategic effects asymmetric approaches can have. However, the employment of different asymmetric approaches in concert with various weapons at different levels of war can have multitude of strategic outcomes.

The levels of war, as defined by conventional U.S. military doctrine, are strategic, operational, and tactical. The strategic level of war comprises national security and foreign policy. The operational level of war encompasses force deployment infrastructure and theater-level forces. The tactical level of war contains field forces, enabling infrastructure, and the selection and manipulation of the battlespace.¹¹ Ideally, the desired effect of the employment of asymmetric approaches should be felt on all levels of war, rippling from the tactical to the strategic. The most pronounced example of the successful employment of asymmetric tactics is September 11. Prior to September 11, the most illustrative example was Pearl Harbor. Strategists will conduct an analysis using these levels of war along with the most prevailing weapons systems.

Today, the general grouping of weapons used in the analysis of asymmetric threats are nuclear, chemical, biological, information operations, organizational concepts, and terrorism. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are normally clustered into a disharmonious trio called Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) and are analyzed as a group. Generally speaking, WMD are evaluated in the following order, considered to be the order of effectiveness: nuclear, biological, and chemical. Employment of nuclear weapons, ballistic or otherwise, is the most feared on all levels of war. Most recently, a derivative class of nuclear weapons has become radiological weapons, which do not carry the casualty potential of nuclear weapons, but achieve the desired result of making an entire theater uninhabitable by humans and other animals. Biological weapons are general perceived to be the next step down from nuclear weapons because of their ability to spread, particular contagious agents. Biological weapons can spread as an alarming rate and can kill with pinpoint accuracy. Chemical weapons are the least effective of the WMD because of their relative instability and inaccuracy. Among the other asymmetric weapons generally considered, the most widely publicized is information operations; which encompasses cyberterrorism, cyberwarfare, or any generalized attacks on a nationís electronic infrastructure. Nuclear weapons could be used to inflict widespread infrastructure damage via High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP), which is a byproduct of a nuclear bomb being detonated in the Earthís atmosphere. A 50-kiloton exoatmospheric detonation centered over central Nebraska could disable the majority of the United Stateís unprotected electronic infrastructure, disabling most industries and infrastructure, and cover 90% of the continental landmass while producing little or no direct human casualties.¹² If the United States has this level of exposure, its allies have an even greater level of exposure. Organization asymmetries exist in opponents that are organized differently; primarily networked versus hierarchical. Terrorism is a special classification, as it can employ and use all of the weapons and methods discussed here to inflict widespread panic and terror in its opponent. These are the tools and some of the tactics of asymmetric warfare, but let us examine the broader forms.

Generally speaking, there are six forms of asymmetric warfare: method, technology, will, morale, normative, organizational, and patience. Method generally refers to the employment of different tactical doctrines and operational concepts than an opponent. The methodological form of asymmetrical warfare will generally be seen on the operational and tactical levels of war. Technological forms of asymmetrical warfare are the most prevalent as it generally employs technologically superior weapons against an opponent. Technological asymmetry is used on all levels of war. Asymmetric will can be used to propel a campaign or cause forward. An opponentís unwillingness to surrender or accept defeat can protract a war until a wholly superior opponent gives up. Asymmetric will can be used on all levels of war. Morale of troops can be manipulated in order to create an asymmetric advantage for the enemy. Using radio broadcasts and other mass medium to push forward an image or agenda can create this asymmetry, commonly known now as the "CNN effect." Normative asymmetries exist when there are differences in ethical and legal standards between opponents. Most notably, normative asymmetries exist between Jews and Muslims. Organizational asymmetries are most notable when a conflict involves a state and non-state actor. Typically, non-state actors will be organized in a network fashion, where a state actor will be organization hierarchically. Asymmetries of patience are created when opponents view time differently.¹³ The United States typically desires a short, decisive battle with a definitive outcome, whereas terrorist opponents may be willing to wait for years between attacks as was the case with the World Trade Center. The first attack came in 1993. The final attack that brought the Towers down came in 2001. This was an eight-year battle, or even longer, for the terrorists involved whereas the United States only saw two separate and distinct actions.

Now that we have examined the characteristics, weapons, and forms of asymmetric warfare, how is it possible to protect or plan against an asymmetrical attack? The nature of the "threat-response dynamic" is to analyze all real and perceived threats and vulnerabilities to produce a counter measure or reinforcement to a vulnerability.¹⁴ It is a vicious circle, for the act of analysis and response constantly produces additional threats and vulnerabilities as resources are shifted to compensate for perceived or real threats and vulnerabilities. It will never be possible to fully protect against an asymmetric attack, as there are limited resources and an almost infinite number of scenarios to be considered. The best that any state or non-state can hope for is that intelligence is leveraged in such to create a list of most likely scenarios to guard against and that this list is correct. At the core of this dynamic is intelligence; not the quantity of intelligence, but the quality of both the data and the analysis. Any state or non-state that wishes to be successful in countering asymmetric threats or attacks must have a productive and accurate intelligence system in place. This intelligence system should be responsible for the collection, dissemination, and analysis of data in response to balanced priorities set by the stateís or organizationís leadership. The leadership can be either centralize or decentralized from the perspective of the intelligence system. In addition to a normal collection, analysis, and reporting process, an alerting system based on the concept of "management by exception" must be put in place and tied to early warning systems, systems designed to monitor changes in antagonist activities, and escalate reports via a separate and distinct chain of command. Only with accurate, timely, and complete intelligence can an organization, state or non-state, hope to protect itself against asymmetric threats.

Footnotes

¹ Kenneth McKenzie, Jr. The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the next QDR. Chapter 1.

² Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II. Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts.

³ Ibid.

⁶ Kenneth McKenzie, Jr. The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the next QDR. Chapter 1.

⁸ Craig, Captain D.W. Asymmetrical Warfare and the Transnational Threat: Relearning the Lessons from Vietnam.

¹⁰ Ibid. Chapter 1.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid. Chapter 2.

Bibliography

Craig, Captain D.W. Asymmetrical Warfare and the Transnational Threat: Relearning the Lessons from Vietnam. Department of National Defense (Canada), 1998. (http://wps.cfc.dnd.ca/irc/amsc/amsc1/006.html)

McKenzie, Kenneth Jr. The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the next QDR. Institue for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2000. (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/mcnair62/toc.html)

Metz, Steven and Johnson, Douglas V. II. Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001. (http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2001/asymetry/asymetry.pdf)

Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Oxford University Press, 1963.

Last update: 7/1/03; 7:54:19 AM.