VULNERABILITY AND WARNINGS

In this paper we consider severe weather related warning systems in Australia and propose some vulnerability related lessons that may have appropriate transfer potential to merit consideration in relation to other hazards and locations.

Given vulnerability is in part a function of " ... the degree of social‑ and self‑protection available to potential victims" (ref.1), then clearly, improved warning reduces vulnerability. What then is the essence of warning? We suggest information. Information is that which reduces uncertainty. Warning information involves both warning messages in times of emergency, and education about the general character of risk. 'Warning' incorporates the communication of risk in times of impending emergencies, with the purpose of eliciting public protective actions (ref.2). If appropriate protective action is not elicited, then effective warning has not occurred.

The meaning of 'DUCK!' is different for hunter and hunted. Meaning is what warning is about and meaning is contextual, culture bound. If the warning message is not entirely in the lexicon of the target audience then the warning must be 'decoded' by a process that relies on 'intrinsic' information, ie that already possessed by the recipient. Then the coupling of education and warning message is essential.

The severe weather and flood warning systems in Australia are generally well served at the data collection, analysis and prognosis 'hard end' of the systems. However, effective warning requires the complete system to be functional. The areas of the systems currently offering significant opportunities for improvement and 'return for investment' are related to communicating with the public(s) at risk. These include the format of warning messages, techniques for dissemination and the methods of public education. The 'soft end' of the systems.

There are many issues surrounding warning messages and their effectiveness. The following issue set has been developed from the framework proposed by Mileti and Fitzpatrick (ref.2). We have found it a useful set of prompts and considerations, and have used it as the framework for workshops run to study warning systems in Australia.

1.1 What are the 'necessary' key elements for inclusion in warning messages which contribute to 'sufficient' warning?

(when and how the next warning message, and other information will be available).

1.2 Is the most important information (for public safety) included at the start of messages?

1.4 Do warnings currently place too much emphasis on technical (scientific) details?

1.5 How much information about potential dangers should be included in warning messages (when realisation of the threat is in doubt)?

(For example, what do you do differently for flash floods compared to other forms of flooding?)

1.7 To what extent should risk communication involve graphic and visual material?

1.8 If a set of guidelines on the style and content of warnings is desirable, who should develop it?

2.2 To what degree is it appropriate to use 'category systems' which aim to indicate the severity of any hazard agent?

3.1 Is there consistency within the message itself, between the message and other communications / other agencies, and across time?

3.2 Are discrepancies between messages noted and explained in subsequent messages?

* accuracy relates to the extent to which the message is perceived by the public to be factual, accurate, timely and complete.

* perceived certainty relates to the degree to which the message portrays confidence in what is being said.

3.6 What other issues are important in relation to 'how to deal with uncertainty' in extreme event problems?

* dissemination channels relates to 'how it is delivered', the mechanisms through which risk information is disseminated.

4.1 To what extent are messages disseminated using a range of possible channels instead of a single channel to communicate to a public?

4.2 What does 'the media' need to be aware of in order to contribute to effective risk communication?

* source credibility relates to 'who says so', the extent to which the source of risk information seems credible.

4.3 Is credibility of the information source maximised when it comes from one authority or a set of sources?

* personalisation relates to how characteristics of a community such as ethnicity, age, and gender shape risk communication.

5.1 To what extent are these factors considered when implementing risk communication programs?

* public participation relates to how the community is actively incorporated into risk communication programs and feedback mechanisms indicating warning effectiveness.

5.3 Is the community actively encouraged to participate in risk communication? If so, how?

5.4 Are education and awareness programs structured to incorporate dialogue? If so, how?

5.5 How can 'informal systems' be incorporated into the total warning (risk communication) system?

* relates to who makes decisions involving the above issues, who participates in the decision processes.

6.3 Who is responsible for 'workable plans' (e.g. evacuation) if the workability of a plan is also influenced by the effectiveness of the warning system?

These prompts were used during workshops involving a wide range of clients of the Bureau of Meteorology's warning service. These workshops examined the effectiveness of selected warning systems in Australia. From the output of these workshops, we submit the following considerations as a model for structuring warning messages.

Not all information is of significance to all receivers of warning messages. Public(s) at risk do not generally require long messages of technical detail. However, some target audiences may derive benefit from such detail. As a general guide, aim for the least amount of detail necessary to communicate. This model advocates a hierarchical message structure to replace the dominant paradigm of single level warning messages that emphasise technical detail.

Hierarchical messages should consist of two main areas. The first, and essential segment should contain crucial information for public safety expressed clearly and simply. This essential area should be highlighted by an attention grabbing header or title. As most agencies that originate warnings do not have a comprehensive public dissemination system it is likely that control of the message will be handed over to a broadcaster. Therefore there is a chance that on occasion the title may be called upon to stand alone.

The second, and discretionary segment of the warning message could contain technical information for that segment of the audience who could use it, or advise how more information can be obtained.

Within the above segments of the warning message, there should be three components; information, forecast and warning. Each of these parts would have different prominence at different stages of an event. Variables which influence the specific nature of the above components relate to time, space, nature of the event and target audience(s). This relatively open‑ended structure allows movement through different levels of advice as certainty and confidence increase. The primary advantage of such a structure is its accommodation of uncertainty and an associated retention of the issuing authority's credibility during the development or onset of an extreme event.

The question of which elements should be included in a warning message is widely recognised as a fundamental and crucial issue. This recognition extends to the assertion that there are key elements that need to be incorporated into warning messages.

A set of guidelines on the style and content of warnings should be developed. The development process needs to be 'user driven' using an extensive joint agency/stakeholder approach that includes public consultation wherever possible.

The identification of key elements should be negotiated by stakeholders. Ongoing and iterative processes are an appropriate way to integrate key elements into the structure of warning messages. These processes occur both 'pre‑season' and during events.

Necessary elements to be incorporated by negotiation into the message to facilitate sufficient warning, include:

For warnings related to severe weather, the Bureau of Meteorology is not the appropriate authority to determine recommended action. It should, however, include within warning messages recommendations for public protective action agreed by the competent credible authorities. This would generally be the 'lead combat authority' with expertise in its particular hazard. Under this concept, the input of appropriate individual agencies such as the Bureau of Meteorology, Rural Fire Authority, and the State Emergency Service would be clearly identified. Due to the short lead times associated with many severe weather warnings, the Bureau of Meteorology should have the delegation to choose and assemble 'canned action statements' given certain weather thresholds are reached. This demands the preparation of action statements well before they are used.

2) concentrate on protective actions that can be undertaken in the time available

4) be credited to the appropriate response agency (e.g. " ... and the police suggest... ")

Impact information needs to be understood by the receiver of the message. Understanding is enhanced by presenting information within a known context. For example, the standard hydrological forecast of "gauge height" will be less effective than an impact description specifying the probable depth of flooding in the town ( e.g. "to the top of the hotel door").

The description of phenomenon severity using predefined categories, such as the tropical cyclone category system and the McArthur fire danger rating scale, can cause some misunderstanding or confusion when used in public warnings. With numeric systems, a significant proportion of the public are unclear over whether higher numbers signify a greater or lesser threat.

Category systems that use technical classes such as "Minor", "Moderate" or "Major" (flooding) are more easily interpreted in that the class names alone carry some useful information about severity. However even these can be misleading to a non expert audience. For example, a message about "High" forest fire danger may cause alarm. This is, in fact, a common summer occurrence in southeast Australia and in some areas "Very High" is also common and only "Extreme" fire danger need elicit protective action. The jargon categories "High" and "Extreme" carry very different technical meanings yet are all but indistinguishable to many members of the public.

Category systems should not stand alone. The category should be supported by a self explanatory plain language phrase such as "category four cyclone with very destructive winds." Any category systems used for public warning should be consistent across the country.

The international marine and aviation industries use knots as their unit of speed. Wave heights are described in metres, cloud heights are in feet and visibility is in metres or kilometres. In contrast, public weather and warning services in almost all countries, including Australia, use the metric system. This sometimes results in two sets of forecasts / warnings for the same phenomena and area using different units. This clearly has the potential to cause confusion and is undesirable. However, a range of imposed conventions require it (e.g. international maritime conventions to use nautical miles) and this is problematic.

The frequency warning messages are issued depends on the nature of the event and the resources available to the warning agency. There should be preparedness and provision to receive and accept feedback to allow warning frequency to be modified to an appropriate level suited to each situation.

The general strategy recommended is to use multiple channels. This maximises coverage and provides confirmation, especially when communicating with diverse communities. It becomes even more crucial when confronted with a fast onset event.

A range of technological opportunities are available to enhance dissemination, but high technologies are not always appropriate fixes. There is a need to overcome the overconfidence in the reliance by some groups on certain channels of communication. This problem of over‑reliance is both technical and cultural.

Other constraints and limitations imposed on the choice of dissemination channels include:

2) limits on the availability of distribution networks (e.g. the trend in the mass media to move from local broadcasters to regional networks)

Community participation is encouraged by warning authorities but presently this is only on an ad‑hoc basis, is resource dependant and is currently not widely valued by the warners. Public participation needs to be systematically structured and provided for before the actual warnings are issued.

The connections between education and effective warnings are not simple. Education must be done well to have any real effect. A realistic premise for emergency managers is 'when developing warning systems and constructing warning messages, one cannot assume any positive influence from public education'.

With respect to public education, a multitude of channels and methods is identifiable. The appropriate channels should be linked to the nature and needs of the vulnerable populations. Because lead time is not a constraint in public education, the opportunity of exploring as many channels as possible exists. Emphasis should be placed on the need to be innovative in a world that is information rich and attention poor. Schools should be targeted for incorporation of themes across the curriculum, not merely within specific subject areas. Opportunities exist for inclusion in sections of the main stream mass media through story lines in serial dramas (soap operas).

Progress in the way public education campaigns are conducted in Australia has been quite marked over the last ten years. Techniques have improved from the 'lots of text pamphlet, occasionally shoved in the letterbox' to a range of 'slick, sophisticated, and glossy, multi media' methods. Nevertheless, these campaigns often treat risk as if it were an objective phenomenon for the public at large to be informed about, and this approach may well be fundamentally flawed.

Community analysis has advised some useful considerations in the arena of public education and participation. Methods of identifying community characteristics and vulnerabilities are not new. Where vulnerability depends on proximity to hazard, the severity of the physical impact at each location can be easily identified. However, we are not all equally vulnerable to the same hazard agent. Varley (ref.1) drew attention to " ... the possibility of producing socio‑economic and spatial maps of vulnerability, rather than mapping physical risk alone."

The identification and mapping of differential vulnerability have been recognised for several years (ref.3) and been applied within Australian emergency management using census data available on Compact Disk Read Only Memory (CD ROM) technology (ref.4). An example of such an application that was used in 1988, is shown in Figure 1 "Inundation areas for a dam failure above Canberra," and Table 1 "Selected community characteristics by Collector's Districts (CD's)" (ref.4). This data is useful for informing a range of considerations, from logistics through to matters of culture.

Due to differences in characteristics such as ethnicity and age, people derive different messages from the same information. The implications of this for the management of education campaigns are generally poorly understood by warners.

In the delivery of warning messages, one may reasonably premise occasions when it will not be possible to provide separate warnings to embrace community diversity, therefore words should be simple enough to be accurately translated into other languages (by ethnic radio).

One of the most productive uses of public education may be in the encouragement of local self‑help. This approaches risk as a social construct, to be negotiated. It requires developing an appreciation within the community of the high levels of uncertainty associated with severe weather phenomena coupled with a realistic understanding of other limitations of emergency service capability. This policy requires political will and is currently being trialled for some hazards in some parts of Australia (e.g. bushfire in Victoria, cyclones in Queensland). The net effect of such a strategy is to increase community resilience.

Some difficulties (do and probably will) exist regarding overlapping interests and responsibilities. Varying perceptions exist regarding different responsibilities. However it is generally accepted that many groups and authorities share responsibility for and / or have an interest and influence in the 'complete' warning system. Therefore, an integrated planning process is needed. Any conflicts should be identified, clarified and if possible, resolved 'pre‑season'.

The threshold of phenomena intensity at which it is appropriate to issue public warnings should be negotiated by all of the stakeholders in the warning system. Recent examples in Australia are the raising of the threshold for tropical cyclone warning in Queensland and the reduction of the threshold for fire weather warning in Tasmania. Risk affirms itself as a social construct rather than an 'objective/scientific' phenomenon.

Australia's providers of social‑protection have shown a strong will to ask the right questions about warning and vulnerability; to ask difficult questions of their own role in the risk imposition equation. Asking the right questions progresses one along the path to appropriate solutions. There are several significant parts of Australian warning systems where progress has been quite marked and these are currently pioneering the way for the more cautious.

The most heartening progress is not in the realm of information formatting techniques. The linguistics and psychology of marketing and public relations have a role, but not a pivotal one. Their role is mainly in the 'wording of warnings'. The 'meaning of warning' and the methods of public education must be central. This is fundamentally a cultural and political question. The key is the provision of appropriate enabling processes. Processes founded on dialogue, which arm a community with an understanding of how and why they are vulnerable. Processes that provide appropriate resources and strengthened political structures. Processes that facilitate the development of resilience.

1. VARLEY A. Diasters: Vulnerability and Response. Disasters, 1991, Vol. 15, No. 3, 285-287.

2. MILETI D.S.; FITZPATRICK C. Communication of Public Risk: Its Theory and its Application. Sociological Practice Review 1991, 2, 1, Jan, 20-28.

3. NORRIS D.A.: Disaster Demographics - Mapping high-risk populations can save lives during a catastrophe. American Demographics, 1987, Vol. 9, No. 8.

4. SALTER J.; TARRANT M. Computer manipulated census data and disaster management. The Macedon Digest, 1988, Vol. 3, No. 4, 4-5.

5. SALTER J. Public Education and Disaster Preparedness. Australian National Committee On Large Dams (ANCOLD) Bulletin, 1989, No. 83, 17-19.

The views expressed are those of the authors and as such, do not necessarily reflect views of their parent organisations. We gratefully acknowledge contributions from the many academics, disaster management professionals and warning system stakeholders who provided invaluable input to the processes associated with the development of this paper.