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| Apr Jul |
Headquarters
Special War On Terror Squad
Task Force Iraq
N. Korea Expeditionary Unit
1st Video Division
3rd Interactive Brigade
War Council
Foreign Legion
General Roy, CO
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Sunday, June 29, 2003 |
"Trent steps into a debate between Vlahos & Pournelle. We are not seeing new patterns evolve here, he says. We are seeing old American military cultural memes and patterns re-emerge. The strength of the Vlahos column is that he's starting to ask some of the right questions about adapting the structure of the American military to an age of small wars."
Winds of Change.NET
2:53:22 PM
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Saddam Hussein in particular, and the Baath Party he led in general, were quite good at playing the local and Western media. Now out of power, captured documents and prisoner interrogations make it clear that Baath had a "worst case" plan. If Baath lost power, the Sunni Arabs who comprise most of the Baath Party, would engage in economic sabotage to increase popular unrest. Attacks on coalition troops, encouraged by cash bounties, would encourage the coalition to engage in reprisal measures that would further increase hatred for the foreigners.
StrategyPage
2:26:42 PM
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