When St. looks out into the future, thru the Holy Spirit that inspires his mind and heart he sees nothing that would attract him to that is held to be of calue in this world.

A. The Word Group Outside the NT.

1. logiízomai. In secular Greek this word is used a. commercially for [base "]to reckon,[per thou] [base "]to charge,[per thou] and b. more generally for [base "]to deliberate,[per thou] [base "]to conclude.[per thou]

[COMMENT.ip.crl.3.18.2005.palm.sunday.reflections.elder.ephraim.counsels..ch.1[per thou]On Salvation and Paradise.[per thou] #5]

[c.1] Who looking upward would not find that he sees into eternity, before the face of God in that [base "]darkly mirror[per thou] which is revealed ot us in faith. On the other hand, when looking outward, he sees all the world and all that it has to offer, which is the words of St. Paul, is considered a [OE]noisy gong and a tiknlikg cymbal.[per thou] [1 Cor.] [c.2]

[end.comment]

In the LXX it takes on the nuance: a. of an emotional and even volitional act, e.g., devising, or counting in the subjective sense (see TDNT, IV, 284[^]85 for details). It also: [comment.to.notes.1] Referring to TDNT, IV, 284-285. This word logizmoi is used of [OE]strict logical rules,[base '] or [OE]reckoning.[base '] It can also have the meaning of [OE]evaluating.[base '] [There seems to be some parallel to the thinking of Ignatius of Loyola in his spiritual exercises when he considers the third method of making a decison; that is, thru strict reasoning of the advantages and disadvantages fo a thing to vbe decided on, see Spir. exercises, [OE]On making a Decison[base ']] Could this evaluating of a situation not also have some meaning attachhed to it in reference to [OE]COUNSEL[base '] of the Holy Spirit. Here, as mentioned in the COMMENTS above is what Elder Ephraim speaks about in his counsels on [base "]On Salvation and Paradise.[per thou] I mean he considers its advantages in striving for and the disadvantages and dangers in not striving for it. This too, is what Aquinas means when he says that [OE]free-will[base '] is the will under the aspect of considering the perfect means to an end, rather the will itself must be considered as the last end, which is Charity or the Holy Spirit, which is the human image of that perfect will of God for Himself, Love or the Holy Spirit. [comment.to.notes.2] TDNT, IV, 284-285 speaks about class. lit. referring to logi÷zomai as [base "]deliberation,[per thou] or [base "]to conclude.[per thou] This is precisely what the soul deliberates about, what God has in his Divine Providence has chosen for each soul, [OE]I consider,[base '] do not worry about what you are to say [OE]for it will the Spirit of my Father speaking in you.[base '] Again, this [OE]consideration[base '] is what the Fathers of the Church have done in their reflections on the Mysteries of Faith. Aquinas speaks about the faculties of the intellect, following Aristotle, whcih considers the [OE]indivisibles,[base '] and tha twhich considers [OE]definitions[base '] as such or compsoes and divides. Again, in the introduction to the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle gives this detailed preface to the logistic works of the Stagirite:

FOREWORD OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

As the Philosopher says in Metaphysics I (980b26), "the human race lives by art and reasonings." In this statement the Philosopher seems to touch upon that property whereby man differs from the other animals. For the other animals are prompted to their acts by a natural impulse, but man is directed in his actions by a judgment of reason. And this is the reason why there are various arts devoted to the ready and orderly performance of human acts. For an art seems to be nothing more than a definite and fixed procedure established by reason, whereby human acts reach their due end through appropriate means. Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 1 Now reason is not only able to direct the acts of the lower powers but is also director of its own act: for what is peculiar to the intellective part of man is its ability to reflect upon itself. For the intellect knows itself. In like manner reason is able to reason about its own act. Therefore just as the art of building or carpentering, through which man is enabled to perform manual acts in an easy and orderly manner, arose from the fact that reason reasoned about manual acts, so in like manner an art is needed to direct the act of reasoning, so that by it a man when performing the act of reasoning might proceed in an orderly and easy manner and without error. And this art is logic, i.e., the science of reason. And it concerns reason not only because it is according to reason, for that is common to all arts, but also because it is concerned with the very act of reasoning as with its proper matter. Therefore it seems to be the art of the arts, because it directs us in the act of reasoning, from which all arts proceed. Consequently one should view the parts of logic according to the diversity among the acts of reason.

Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 1

Now there are three acts of the reason, the first two of which belong to reason regarded as an intellect. One action of the intellect is the understanding of indivisible or uncomplex things, and according to this action it conceives what a thing is. And this operation is called by some the informing of the intellect, or representing by means of the intellect. To this operation of the reason is ordained the doctrine which Aristotle hands down in the book of Predicaments, [i.e., Categories]. The second operation of the intellect is its act of combining or dividing, in which the true or the false are for the first time present. And this act of reason is the subject of the doctrine which Aristotle hands down in the book entitled On Interpretation. But the third act of the reason is concerned with that which is peculiar to reason, namely, to advance from one thing to another in such a way that through that which is known a man comes to a knowledge of the unknown. And this act is considered in the remaining books of logic.

Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 2

It should be noted that the acts of reason are in a certain sense not unlike the acts of nature: hence so far as it can, art imitates nature. Now in the acts of nature we observe a threefold diversity. For in some of them nature acts from necessity, i.e., in such a way that it cannot fail; in others, nature acts so as to succeed for the most part, although now and then it fails in its act. Hence in this latter case there must be a twofold act: one which succeeds in the majority of cases, as when from seed is generated a perfect animal; the other when nature fails in regard to what is appropriate to it, as when from seed something monstrous is generated owing to a defect in some principle.

Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 2

These three are found also in the acts of the reason. For there is one process of reason which induces necessity, where it is not possible to fall short of the truth; and by such a process of reasoning the certainty of science is acquired. Again, there is a process of reason in which something true in most cases is concluded but without producing necessity. But the third process of reason is that in which reason fails to reach a truth because some principle which should have been observed in reasoning was defective.

Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 2

Now the part of logic which is devoted to the first process is called the judicative part, because it leads to judgments possessed of the certitude of science. And because a certain and sure judgment touching effects cannot be obtained except by analyzing them into their first principles, this part is called analytical, i.e., resolvent. Furthermore, the certitude obtained by such an analysis of a judgment is derived either from the mere form of the syllogism--and to this is ordained the book of the Prior Analytics which treats of the syllogism as such--or from the matter along with the form, because the propositions employed are per se and necessary [cf. infra, Lectures 10, 13]--and to this is ordained the book of the Posterior Analytics which is concerned with the demonstrative syllogism. Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 2 To the second process of reason another part of logic called investigative is devoted. For investigation is not always accompanied by certitude. Hence in order to have certitude a judgment must be formed, bearing on that which has been investigated. But just as in the works of nature which succeed in the majority of cases certain levels are achieved--because the stronger the power of nature the more rarely does it fail to achieve its effect--so too in that process of reason which is not accompanied by complete certitude certain levels are found accordingly as one approaches more or less to complete certitude. For although science is not obtained by this process of reason, nevertheless belief or opinion is sometimes achieved (on account of the provability of the propositions one starts with), because reason leans completely to one side of a contradiction but with fear concerning the other side. The Topics or dialectics is devoted to this. For the dialectical syllogism which Aristotle treats in the book of Topics proceeds from premises which are provable.

Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 3

At times, however, belief or opinion is not altogether achieved, but suspicion is, because reason does not lean to one side of a contradiction unreservedly, although it is inclined more to one side than to the other. To this the Rhetoric is devoted. At other times a mere fancy inclines one to one side of a contradiction because of some representation, much as a man turns in disgust from certain food if it is described to him in terms of something disgusting. And to this is ordained the Poetics. For the poet's task is to lead us to something virtuous by some excellent description. And all these pertain to the philosophy of the reason, for it belongs to reason to pass from one thing to another.

Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle Foreword p 3

The third process of reasoning is served by that part of logic which is called sophistry, which Aristotle treats in the book On Sophistical Refutations.

b. enters the religious sphere for God[base ']s purposing of evil against a sinful people, or for the purposing of evil against the Lord (cf. Jer. 18:8; Nah. 1:9, 11). Rather different is the reckoning of faith as righteousness in Gen. 15:6, the imputing of sin in Ps. 32:2, and cultic crediting in Lev. 7:18 and 17:4. In cultic imputing the basis is God[base ']s will but there is also something of the commercial sense of charging.

2. logismoés. The noun has the same basic senses as the verb but finds special applications in mathematics and logic. It thus comes to denote the supreme human function, with an ethical orientation in Stoicism. It is reason in its concrete form in the consciousness and as worked out in action. The law is its basis in 4 Maccabees. In the LXX the word also has the common sense of [base "]plan,[per thou] good when it is God[base ']s plan to save, but usually bad (Ezek. 38:10). In Wisdom it is self-vaunting reason apart from God (1:3).

B. The Word Group in the NT. Paul uses logiízesthai in all its nuances, though bending it to his own purposes, logismoés occurs only twice in Paul. In the rest of the NT logiízesthai is rare and weak, and logismoés is never used at all.

1. Thought Taken Captive to Christ. Paul expresses the popular philosophical idea of thought in his use of logismoés. In Rom. 2:15, where he stands on common ground with the diatribe, he has logismoés in a positive sense for the thoughts which, on the basis of moral law, either accuse or excuse. Its function, however, is only judicial. In 2 Cor. 10:4, where the logiízesthai of v. 2 is hostile to Paul and reflects an overestimation of reason, the situation is different. The logismoií are the thoughts of arrogant reason which can be subdued, not by reason[base ']s own weapons, but only by God[base ']s power as this is set forth at the cross (cf. Lk. 22:37 quoting Is. 53:12). The logismoií are not destroyed but reoriented to divine reality. Hence logiízesthai can become a term for the judgment of faith in Rom. 3:28; Phil. 3:13. This is an obedient logiízesthai in which we judge on the basis of the justifying efficacy of Christ[base ']s work (Rom. 3:28) or consider that present suffering is not to be compared with future glory (8:18). It is also unconditionally valid; there can be no objection when Paul thinks he is not inferior

{p. 537}

as an apostle (2 Cor. 11:5), or when he considers that he has not yet achieved perfection (Phil. 3:13), or when he calls us to consider that we are dead to sin and should act accordingly (Rom. 6:11), or even when the weak think things to be unclean (14:14).

2. logiízesthai in the Apostle[base ']s Ministry. In the estimation of his work in 2 Cor. 3:5 Paul uses logiízesthai in a broader sense than that of thought. As in 1 Cor. 13:11 and 2 Cor. 10:2, judgment involves commitment to action.

3. logiízesthai in the Community[base ']s Life. In Phil. 4:8 Paul is not asking for mere reflection but for the practical consideration that leads to action. The same applies in 1 Cor. 13:5, where what is at issue in this very un-Greek combination is not reflecting on a principle but living according to the fact of salvation (Phil. 2:5ff.). When Christ is normative, logiízesthai involves the power to live. It is not arbitrarily or aimlessly impelled to action, but unfolds in the community and comes to fulfilment in the edification of the community (1 Cor. 12 and 14).

4. logiízesthai as God[base ']s Saving Act.

a. God imputes faith (cf. Jms. 2:23; Rom. 4:3ff.; Gal. 3:6). This imputing sets up a relation between salvation and faith and raises the question of merit. In Gen. 15:6 God reckons faith as righteousness because he is pleased to do so and not because it has intrinsic worth. Yet a tendency develops, especially among the rabbis, to remove the judgment from God[base ']s personal will and turn it into general recognition. The Greek term logiízesthai fits in with this trend, for while it embraces the idea of imputation, it also carries with it the idea of recognition, which implies that faith is also a merit. Jms. 2:23 breaks with this trend by stressing, not the meritoriousness of faith, but its commitment to action. Paul makes an even more decisive break in Rom. 4:3ff., where he is plainly playing off the Hebraic logiízesthai of the LXX against the Greek use, as may be seen by his contrasting of gift and debt (v. 4). The presupposition here is that the very question why faith should be reckoned for righteousness is a false one unless an answer is sought in the grace of the cross. The point of faith is that in it believers subject themselves to divine judgment and mercy and are ready to live by divine grace. On the basis of the cross righteousness is now the true reality, so that this imputation is no fiction. The reality of God[base ']s assessment thus serves as a norm of action. Believers become new creatures by God[base ']s logiízesthai, which carries with it the imparting of the Spirit (Gal. 3:2ff.). Paul, then, restores Gen. 15:6 to its true sense, corrects the trend supported by the Greek sense of logiízesthai, and presents dikaiouén and logiízesthai as complementary terms whereby God the Judge is also God the Father.

b. The reverse side of the imputing of faith is the nonimputing of sin (Rom. 4:7-8; 2 Cor. 5:19; cf. Ps. 32:2). The intrusion of grace into divine justice offends the Greeks linguistically and the Jews materially. The cross is the point of union, for if God does not impute sin to us, it is because Christ has been made sin for us. logiízesthai is here again a judgment of grace, but it is the only connecting point between Gen. 15:6 and Ps. 32:2, for the imputing of faith obviously embraces much more than the nonimputing of sin. Justin Dialogue 141.2-3 rather misses the point when he suggests that repentance is the ground of nonimputation (cf. faith in 1 Clem. 10.6). [H. W. HEIDLAND, IV, 284[^]92]

When beginning his commentary on the Gospel fo St. John Aquinas first shows that it is important to first understand how the intellect comes to form a word within itself. First he shows the two operations of the intellect: one which composes and divides; the other, which understands indivisibles. He then goes on to show how the word formed by the intellect in a rational creature is different from the WORD which is God in the mind of the Eternal Father-the Only-Begotten Son.

In a sense we mirror in our understanding what we understand our word to be and extrapolate of thru proportional analogy come to some faint understanding of what the WORD which contains all reality is.

IP CRL

[scg.bk.4.ch.20.par.1.sent.1] Hence the Holy Ghost is the cause of the creation: and this is indicated (Ps. ciii. 30): Send forth thy Spirit and they shall be created. [scg.bk.4.ch.20.par.1.sent.1] Also, seeing that the Holy Ghost proceeds by way of love, and that love is an impelling and moving force, any movement that God causes in things is rightly appropriated to the Holy Ghost.

CHILDREN BORN INTO FREEDOM

As Aquinas brings to our attention that it is the Holy Spirit that makes possible creation, which means that at every instant in whcih we 'reside' in creation we are his debtors. In every possible phase of our life it is the Creator Spirit that calls us out of nothingness into being, that ratifies our existence and our existence among other in human society and among all God's creation. As we look at the many kinds of freedom that are available to God's creatures we see more deeply into the working of the Holy Spirit in giving us a 'choice' among the many good things that come to us daily. Freedom in America has always been understood as the ability to make one's dream come true, speaking simply as a national dream come true, but there are also more deep considerations in the word freedom which we have been given: the freedom to pursue happiness, the pursuit of religious freedom, the freedom of speech. Each one of these freedoms has also some responsibilities to them. But the essential consideration is: what is the source of our freedom? Where does it come from? Does our freedom in America have at its root a different source than freeodm of the European peoples, the African people's, the Asian people's, etc? It doesn't seem reasonable that someone would consider that human freedom is absolutely equal to American freedom. At the same time, there must be essential differences between human freedom as it is in itself, availabel to every man and woman and American freedom available to only Americans.

I PLACE BEFORE YOU LIFE AND DEATH, CHOOSE LIFE

In the Bible God tells his Chosen people, I place before you today life and death, choose life. So we know where the WORD of GOD stands in reference to the use of our freedom, he stands for life. In the passage above, we have St. Thomas advocating the God of life who being the principle of life moves each and every human to life not death. Someone may want to understand more clearly what this life is in which God speaks about. On the other hand, it cannto be a life that it devoid of reason or is discordant to reason otherwise the God of life who is the exemplar of every good and who places the desire of these good things in mankind would be working against himself, which is impossible. God is truth. Therefore, the God of Life who advocates life not death must be in accordance with the demans of reason and not irrational desires.

Furthermore, life means growth and change. The God of life and freedom would advocate growth and change in the human good which is also in accord with reason; that is, where we see the possibility of choosing the grades of life over death God would have to be present. For example, for a child with learning disabilities to have the freedom in school to change form one curriculm to another more challenging one according to his potential to learn would be a reasonable desire uphelp by God's laws and the freedom of an American student with learning disabilities.

Take for another example the rights every American citizen has to pursue his own education. A personn has a choice to make. He can choose between different universities, different places according to his likes or expenses; today there are online universities where a person can learn form the comfort of their home or at a local trade school, 2 or 4 year college. Lastly, a person can pursue graduate adn post graduate degrees in many fields. All of these possibilities are within the 'choices' of an American citizen. Do these choices bring one freedom? Can any one of these choices bring a person to that true freedom which is available to every person, regardless of age, race or color; that is, anyone who may be or become a citizen of the United States? In this respect I think that Thomas Aquinas gives to us something which we have to consider here; that is, that the essence of and the substance of our very freedom apart from the Constitutions come form a higher power altogether. Furthermore, that this very power which granted to the United States founding fathers was of this same power; that is, the power of the Holy Spirit. This is the reason for quoting at the beginning of our reflecitons here that our essential cause for being a citizen in the United States is the Holy Spirit. As Aquinas clearly presents:

[scg.bk.4.ch.20.par.1.sent.1] Also, seeing that the Holy Ghost proceeds by way of love, and that love is an impelling and moving force, any movement that God causes in things is rightly appropriated to the Holy Ghost.

I mean that the love which moved the founding fathers of this country to start what they considered a land of freedom and democracy was itself a derivative of the freedom of choice that is given to every human being. What Aquinas calls an essential charater of love as an 'impelling and moving force' must be looked at more carefully in order to establish what teh Holy Spirit was accomplishing in the early founding of America. Then perhaps other questions could be faced: Is America in conjunction with the original freedom of choice which the founding Fathers experienced and understood and judged and took responsibility for when they established this democratic society we call the United States of America? I do not say that I have an answer for this altogether. What I do say is that without the Holy Spirit, according to the teaching of the CatholicChurch and the Fathers of the Church there cannot be true freedom nor a true expression of it. On the other hand, how does someone know when he is making a free choice that is in accord with the Holy Spirit? the Apostles had this problem. After Jesus died and was not yet revealed as arisen from the dead the Apostles decided to return fishing. It seems that they had the use of natural reason, but perhaps they could not see further than this. There was some significant event that took place, which is detailed in the Acts of the Apostles which is reltated to as Pentecost. There was a profound change in the Apostles and followers fo Jesus at this time and it was something that, according to the promise of Jesus, would take place. But there was a period of preparation, of gestation. Is it right to ask, has America had its Pentecost? Some say it has? Surely the gift of giving birth to a nation that is as poweful as America is today, as such a world power cannot go unnoticed. In other words, something very powerful gave the power to each of the founding fathers, 'impelled them and move them,' again using the words of Aquinas, to produce in their minds and hearts for the future generation in which they were doing this to circumvent and outline in advance such a nation as they conceived it to be and to become. There must be admitted that this force was greater than anyone of them and all together. But what they created was not opposed to human reason nor the fond hearts of every person pursuing the good of life; that is, they sought what every man would naturally seek. On the other hand it does not seem to fit within the category of reasonableness to consider some of the things that America has produced within itself to fall within this boundary of the overall human good, though 'some' may call these events happiness or freedom. Perhaps the judiciary system comes into play in this consideration; that is, there is a dialectic that take splace in the interaction of human freedoms; that is individuals who have a common freedom but desire to ecxpress it in different ways. We cann ot imagine that the founding Fathers had in mind every possible freedom that would ever be expressed in America adn all that this would mean. I believe that this brings into play the very significant role of religion in America. That elements which cannot be fully explained by human reason alone, but yet is at work in our freedom. Of course this is the age-old question which has been asked hundreds of years before America was born. The Europeans, Asians, Meditteranean peoples all have always asked this question.

IP CRL

+God has given to us every spiritual blessing in the heavens. +God has given to us what we need to live Holy and spotelss in His sight.. +God has given to us a santifying Spirit... +God has given to us infinitely more than we can ask or imagine.

Ps. 4:1 I called to Him and he asnwered me, the God of my justification. Ps. 8:1 I called to Him and he answered me, the God who 'renewed the face of the earth.' Ps. 4:1 I called to Him and He set my feet upon a rock and gave me spacious freedom.

IP CRL

The Philokalia Vol. 1-IV faber & faber [1979-1995]

'God is one, unoriginate, incomprehensible, possessing completely the total potentiality of being, altogether excluding notions of when and how, inaccessible to all, and not to be known through image by any creature.' ST. MAXIMOS THE CONFESOR [Vol. II, PG. 114]

This is how St. Maximos starts his Centuries on Theology and the INCARNATE DISPENSATION of the Son of God. In a similar introduction St. Thomas Aquinas opens his summa contra gentiles by stating that God Himself cannot be known, but by way of remotion we can know what he is not' tha tis, by removing all that he is not, we can peer into the scriptures revelation and contemplate the beauty of who he has revelaed Himslf to be; Aquinas relies upon sacred scripture as a rule, just as Pseudo-Dionysius did in the opening paragraph of the Divien Names, as the only way in which God can be gazed upon, in faith, and in darkness of revelation. Both in teh natural order of reason and in the supernatural order of Divein Revelation, Maximos puts forth these stepping stones to the reality of God in order to set a foundation for Theological thinking in the Divine Dispensation and to reveal the Son of God.

He says He is One, since Unity and simplicity is part of God's nature, 'God is Spirit.' Even Augustine opens his great book , the Confession, extolling the greatness fo God by naming his essential attributes.' As the Catholic Church teaches, 'all the Divine Attributes are identical among themselves and with the Divine Essence.' Now, the Theotokos, she bore this Sacred Humanity in her womb and gave birth to Him, the WORD. So seeing this WORD leap down from Heaven within her womb at the OVERSHADOWING of the HOLY SPIRIT was the INCARNATION. Who could comprehend this 'God form God, Light form Light, True God from TRue God, ' taking flesh adn living among us, so much so that St. John could say, 'what our eyes have seen and our hands have touched, the Word of life.' So MAximos says, 'incomprehensible' to signify that every created intrellect or intellection cannot encompass what is above it, but only from afar contemplate the reality that has been revelaed in jesus Christ 'as in a darkly mirror.'

IP CRL